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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 970747-CA 
v. : 
LINDA A. KALMAR, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's Opening Brief 
("S.B."), the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments 
contained in Appellee's Responsive Brief ("Br. Aple"). Relevant facts are included as needed 
in the discussion below. 
Issue on Appeal 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to clarify the issue on appeal. Defendant 
correctly observes that the State has not challenged the trial court's finding that good cause 
existed for allowing her to withdraw her plea. Br. Aple. 14. Thus, the only issue before this 
Court is whether the trial court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) to 
grant defendant's untimely motion to withdraw her plea. Br. Aple. 14. If the trial court did 
not have jurisdiction to grant the motion, then the existence of good cause to withdraw the plea 
is irrelevant. State v. CanfiekL 917 P.2d 561. 562 (Utah App. 1996). If this Court should hold 
1 
that the trial court did have jurisdiction to grant the motion, affirmance is proper because the 
State has not challenged the trial court's finding of good cause.1 
Defendant argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to allow withdrawal of her no 
contest plea because 1) she was not properly informed of the time limits for withdrawing her 
plea; 2) the 30-day limitation period had not yet begun to run because a plea held in abeyance 
is not "entered" until after the conclusion of the plea in abeyance agreement; and 3) the trial 
court's ruling allowing defendant to withdraw her plea was proper as an arrest of judgment 
under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and therefore not subject to the 30-day 
limitation. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF THE 30-
DAY LIMITATION PERIOD IN HER PLEA AFFIDAVIT. 
As explained in the State's opening brief, the 30-day limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6 (1995) for withdrawing a guilty or no contest plea is jurisdictional so long as the 
defendant has been advised of that time limit before entering the plea. S.B. at 6; State v. 
Canfield. 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 
1992). Defendant acknowledges that her plea affidavit states that she knew of the time limit 
for withdrawing her plea. Br. Aple. 18. She argues, however, that for purposes of triggering 
the 30-day limitation period, a plea affidavit alone is insufficient as a matter of law to ^inform" 
failure to challenge the trial court's finding on this point should not be interpreted 
as a concession that good cause existed. The State has simply chosen for strategic 
reasons not to challenge that finding. If the issue of good cause were germane to this 
appeal, the State would dispute defendant's suggestion that there was an insufficient 
factual basis to support her plea or that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking her plea. 
2 
a defendant of the time limits for withdrawing a plea. Br. Aple. 18. 
A. A plea affidavit may be used to inform defendant of the time limit for 
withdrawing a plea. 
Defendant first argues that rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires the trial 
court to personally advise a defendant of the time limit for withdrawing a plea during the plea 
colloquy, and that failure to do so defeats the jurisdictional nature of the 30-day limitation. 
Br. Aple. 17-18. The plain language of that rule, however, as well as case law interpreting 
the requirements of rule 11, suggest the opposite and indicate that a plea affidavit alone may 
be used to properly inform defendant of the time limit. 
Rule 11 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a trial court may not accept 
a guilty or no contest plea unless it first finds, inter alia, that the plea is made voluntarily, the 
defendant knows of and understands the constitutional rights that will be waived by entering 
the plea, the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea 
is entered, and the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence. Subsection (e)(7) 
also requires the trial court to find that ''the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea." 
As defendant points out, failure to strictly comply with rule 11 is grounds for allowing 
a defendant to withdraw a timely plea. State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309,1313-14 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991); State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989). This is because less 
than strict compliance suggests that the plea may not have been knowing and voluntary. 
Smith. 812 P.2d at 478; State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1995). 
3 
However, rule 11(f) expressly provides that "[fjailure to advise the defendant of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty [or] no contest... is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion 
under Section 77-13-6." In other words, whether or not a defendant is informed of the time 
limit for withdrawing a plea is irrelevant to whether there was strict compliance with rule 11 
in taking that plea. Consequently, failure to inform a defendant of the time limits does not 
make a plea either unknowing or involuntary. 
Defendant posits that use of the word "advise" in subsection (f) suggests that the trial 
judge must personally advise defendant of the time limitation. Br. Aple. 17-18. That 
argument does not comport with precedent from both of Utah's appellate courts finding strict 
compliance with rule 11 by looking not only at the oral colloquy between the court and the 
defendant, but also at the "contents of a written affidavit that the record reflects was read, 
understood, and acknowledged by defendant and the court, and contents of other documents 
such as the information, presentence reports, [and] exhibits." State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 
218 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Utah 1993) (per curiam); 
State v. Penman, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,13 (Utah App., June 25, 1998); State v. Truiillo-
Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Indeed, this Court has expressly recognized that although rule 11 must be strictly satisfied, the 
trial court "need not repeat, verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed and answered 
in the affidavit, unless Rule 11 by its terms specifically requires such repetition" Smith, 812 
P.2d at 477(emphasis added); see also Penman, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 (trial court need not 
perform "verbatim recitation of each and every statement made in the defendant's affidavit' *); 
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Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d at 599 (same). In other words, a trial judge need not personally 
advise a defendant of a rule 11 term unless rule 11 itself expressly requires it. 
As this Court recognized in Smith, Rule 11 specifically requires a personal advisement 
by the court on only two of its provisions. 812 P.2d at 477, n.2. Subsection (g)(2) provides 
that if sentencing recommendations are allowed, "the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court" (emphasis 
added). Similarly, subsection (h)(3) states that if the judge decides that final disposition 
should be different than that contemplated by the plea agreement, *\\it judge shall advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea/' These two 
subsections differ significantly from rule 11(e)(7) and 11(f). the provisions that govern 
informing a defendant of the time limits for withdrawal of a plea. Subsections (g)(2) and 
(h)(3) specifically require the court io advise the defendant. In contrast, subsections (e)(7) and 
(f) use the passive voice, requiring only that the court find that the defendant "has been 
advised,*' without specifying how or by whom that advisement should be made. Thus, by their 
terms, subsections (e)(7) and (f) do not require a trial court to personally advise the defendant, 
only that the advisement be made. 
It is also significant that strict compliance with rule 11 does not require the trial court 
to personally advise a defendant of important constitutional rights or even to personally inquire 
into defendant's understanding of the nature and elements of the offense. See Penman, 346 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 (trial court not required to personally engage defendant in colloquy about 
each element of crime so long as affidavit addresses elements); Truiillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 
at 599-600 (trial court not required to personally inquire as to defendant's understanding of 
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nature and elements of charge or whether defendant understood possible sentences so long as 
addressed in affidavit). Instead, the trial court may rely on a properly executed plea affidavit 
reciting those factors if the court has established that defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. Maguire. 830 P.2d at 218; Abevta, 852 P.2d at 
995-96; Penman. 346 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13; see also rule 11(e).2 Given that a trial court need 
not personally advise a defendant of matters that go directly to whether a plea is knowing and 
voluntary, it is anomalous to suggest that the trial court must nevertheless personally advise 
a defendant of a time limit, even though the failure to do so would not result in setting aside 
the plea or in an unknowing or involuntary plea. 
In sum, nothing in either the language of rule 11 or controlling legal precedent supports 
defendant's position that a defendant is not 'informed^ of the 30-day limitation unless he or 
she is personally advised of that time limit by the trial judge. 
2On November 1, 1997, approximately six weeks after defendant entered her plea, 
rule 11(e) was amended to add these two paragraphs: 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required 
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
This amendment appears to adopt the standard already set forth in the case law 
cited above. 
6 
B. The plea affidavit in this case is sufficient to establish that defendant was 
informed of the 30-day limitation period. 
Defendant next argues that even if the trial judge was not required to personally advise 
her of the time limit, the plea affidavit may not be relied on to show that she was informed of 
the limitation period because the trial court in this case did not properly incorporate the 
affidavit into the plea colloquy as required by rule 11(e). Specifically, defendant alleges that 
the affidavit was not incorporated because the court did not ascertain during the plea colloquy 
that defendant had read, understood and acknowledged the affidavit. Br. Aple. 18-20. 
Defendant relies on case law addressing rule 11 strict compliance to support her argument. 
As stated above, whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 may be 
determined by looking not only at the plea colloquy, but at the entire record. Maguire, 830 
P.2d at 218; Smith. 812 P.2d at 477; Penman. 346 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. Plea affidavits may 
properly form part of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance if they have been properly 
incorporated into the record, such as when the trial court ascertains in the plea colloquy that 
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the information contained in the 
affidavit. Maguire. 830 P.2d at 217. Thus, 
if an affidavit is used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the 
plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the 
defendant understands the affidavit and voluntarily signed it Any omissions 
or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must 
any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. Then the affidavit 
itself, signed by the required parties, can be incorporated into the record. 
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477, quoted with approval in Maguire. 830 P.2d at 217-18; see also 
Valencia. 776 P.2d at 1335. Thus, defendant is correct that for purposes of strict compliance 
with rule 11, a trial court may not rely on a plea affidavit unless it addresses that affidavit 
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sufficiently to establish that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily signed the affidavit. 
The issue here, however, is not whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11. 
The question is whether defendant was informed of the time limit for withdrawing her plea, 
thereby triggering the jurisdictional nature of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. See Canfield, 917 
P.2d at 562; Price, 837 P.2d at 583. That question does not turn on whether a defendant 
knowingly or voluntarily entered her plea or on whether her plea affidavit was properly 
incorporated into the record for purposes of demonstrating strict rule 11 compliance. Indeed, 
as stated above, failure to advise a defendant of the time limits for withdrawing a plea has no 
effect on the validity of a plea or on a determination regarding strict compliance with rule 11. 
As a practical matter, whether a defendant has been informed of the 30-day limitation 
is a factual issue that ought to be determined by resort to the entire record, without regard to 
whether the plea itself was knowing and voluntary or was taken in strict compliance with rule 
11. That should include looking at the plea affidavit, even if it is not specifically addressed 
in the plea hearing. 
The entire record in this case shows that defendant was in fact informed of the 30-day 
limitation period. Defendant signed in open court a plea affidavit that expressly stated that she 
knew and understood that if she desired to withdraw her plea, she must do so by filing a 
motion within thirty days after entry of her plea (R. 22). The affidavit also attested that 
defendant had read the statements contained in the affidavit, or that she had had those 
statements read to her by her attorney (R. 22). The affidavit further stated that defendant 
understood the provisions contained in the affidavit and that she knew that she was free to 
change or delete anything contained in the statement, but that she did not wish to make any 
8 
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defendant was 52 years old, that she had obtained a bachelor's degree, that she could read and 
understand the English language, that at the time she entered her plea she was not under the 
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mentally capable of understanding the proceedings (R. 22-23). 
Underneath defendant's signature, defense counsel certified that he knew that defendant 
III i|il i II , K ! (I in i ( i l t i d j 1 ' I'll 1  ni t in ill II / l i i ' i i l i i " ni l l l n i M ' n l . i 1 i i I  HI % I i II ml III1 'i I I  Vfc'iKC I'MIIIM.'I tnrMiiT 
certified that he had discussed the contents of the affidavit with defendant and that in his 
opinion defendant "fully [understood] the meaning of its contents and [was] mentally and 
The foregoing demonstrates that defendant was informed of the 30-day limitation for 
filing a motion u> \\ ithdraw her plea. To assume otherwise would require this Court to believe 
court that defendant had read and understood the contents of the affidavit and that defense 
counsel had discussed the affidavit with her. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests 
" I " f i i f i 1 . M l * ' i ' " I JU1IL ' d l t C S k ' l l Il I l l l i j l l I h i I I I i l l ll it» f f l i i l j \ j l K M n p , * 
signing it, defendant cannot nov\ argue ihat she was informed -J: ihe 30-day limitation 
contained in* that affidavit. 
D e i c i : • • ^ i - - . r - tl •* - •• ^^ - •-•• • ' -• • ! . - . M h t - M ' - i 
because her affidavit, when read in conjunction with the plea in abeyance agreement, was 
ambiguous as to when the 30-day limitation period began to run. Defendant acknowledges 
(hat lite aKkJ.nil t lcail) sliilcs lli.il In i \4VA I nuhl I't ', IMIMI.IV,II 'ml;, il M"i" I I I " I I M I I W / I Y (ilcil 
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within thirty days "after the entry of [the] plea" (R. 22). Br. Aple. 19. She argues, however, 
that her plea in abeyance agreement contemplated that she would be able to withdraw her plea 
after the restitution hearing, which was set for more than 30 days after her plea hearing. 
Defendant contends that because the term "entry of plea" was not defined for her, she could 
have reasonably understood that her plea would not be "entered" until after the plea in 
abeyance agreement had concluded. Br. Aple. 19-20. Defendant thus concludes that it was 
not clear to her whether the 30 days began to run at the time of the plea proceeding or whether 
the thirty days would begin to run only after judgment was entered against her.3 
Contrary to defendant's argument, neither the plea affidavit nor the plea in abeyance 
agreement are ambiguous as to when her plea was "entered." Indeed, a review of the language 
in both those documents demonstrates that both parties and the court understood that defendant 
"entered" her plea at the plea proceeding. The first page of the plea affidavit states, "I have 
entereda plea of no contest" (R. 18; S.B. Addendum B) (emphasis added). The second page 
states, *T am entering this plea" (R. 19) (emphasis added). Both these statements indicate that 
defendant, her counsel, and the State understood that she was "entering" her plea then at the 
hearing and not at some future date. Significantly, the order of the trial court appended to the 
affidavit states that "the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in 
the statement be accepted and entered"(R. 25;S.B. Addendum A). 
The plea in abeyance agreement also demonstrates that defendant knew she was 
3As with any plea in abeyance, a judgment and conviction would be entered 
against defendant only if she did not comply with the terms of the plea agreement. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-3, -4 (1995), and discussion infra at *. 
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e i i • • . . • » - i . i 
contest plea" and that ^[a]t the time [defendant] enters a no contest plea, the attorney for the 
State , and the attorney for [defendant] will move the Court to hold the plea in abeyance and 
agreement* \K. 2 t , 5. ii. Addendum C) (emphasis added). The parties mo\ed lu hold 
defendant's plea in abeyance at the plea hearing because that is when she entered it (R. 46,47, 
• " JT • 
been entered. 
It is also significant that the plea in abeyance agreement provided that if defendant did 
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dismissed after at least six months had expired from the date of the entry ofthe plea " (R. 26-
27). This statement conclusively demonstrates that all parties to this agreement understood 
T • • *• plea at tl le j: leal learii lg ai id tl lat tl lis date :)f ei lti ;; '" " : - : 1 il i I: * til le 
point irom which ihc pica agreement would run. In addition, the agreement expressly 
contemplates that after certain conditions had been met. the plea could be withdrawn. It is 
In sum, defendant was actually and adequately informed of the time limits for 
withdrawing her plea in her plea affidavit. The plea in abeyance agreement did not render the 
parties to the plea agreement understood that defendant's plea was "entered" at tlle plea 
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hearing.4 
POINT II 
THE 30-DAY LIMITATION IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 
APPLIES TO ALL GUILTY OR NO CONTEST PLEAS, 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PLEA IS HELD IN 
ABEYANCE.5 
Defendant argues that a plea in abeyance is not subject to the 30-day limitation in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) because unlike other pleas, pleas held in abeyance are not 
"entered" at the time they are accepted by the court. Br. Aple. 31. Rather, according to 
defendant, a plea in abeyance is entered only if judgment is entered for a defendant's failure 
to comply with the terms and conditions of the plea agreement. Defendant's argument fails 
when viewed within the context and nature of pleas in abeyance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l (1995) defines a plea in abeyance as 
an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the defendant, accepting 
a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, entering 
judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
In other words, while the trial court accepts a defendant's plea, it does not enter a judgment 
of conviction on the plea so long as the defendant complies with the conditions contained in 
the plea agreement. A plea may be held in abeyance for up to 18 months in a misdemeanor 
case or up to three years for a felony case. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(5). 
4If this Court should hold that defendant was not "informed" of the 30-day 
limitation period, it need not reach any of the other issues raised by defendant as that 
determination would defeat the jurisdictional nature of the limitation period. 
5This point responds to point I.C. of defendant's brief, pages 30-32. 
12 
If a defendant successfully completes the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement ihc 
court may "allow7 withdrawal of defendant's plea and order -v dismissal of the case « \dh 
( 
abeyance, although it appears to contemplate that the withdrawal occur before the expiration 
of the time that the plea is held in abeyance, and then only if the defendant has met all the 
tin Iiii'iii Hi', ul'lhi; |"), d jLUWiiiHit HOMI" n i) ill. ,.11,11 (in,! ill it (lie Irfend.mt tus Ihilol In 
comply with any of the terms or conditions of the plea agreement, the court "may terminate 
the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant 
judgment will be entered on a plea in abeyance only if the defendant fails to comply with the 
terms of his plea agreement. There is no provision that allows a defendant to withdraw a plea 
1 1 101 e tl lai 1 30 days af tei ei iti y of the plea if defr 
the plea in abeyance agreement. 
Defendant acknowledges that a trial judge "accepts" a plea in abeyance, but contends 
limitation period for w ithdrawing a plea. Br. Aple. 31. Defendant further asserts that entry 
of a plea in abeyance will occur, if at all, at the time judgment is entered against defendant for 
to withdraw7 a plea held in abeyance for up to 30 days after judgment is entered, an event that 
occurs only if defendant has violated the conditions of the agreement. Defendant's argument 
prior decisions. 
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Although the plea in abeyance statutory provisions speak in terms of the court 
'"accepting" a plea, a reading of those provisions together makes it relatively clear that 
"acceptance of a plea" is the same as "entry of a plea." For example, section 77-2a-3, which 
governs the manner in which a plea in abeyance is to be taken, is titled "Manner of entry of 
plea — Powers of court/' Section 77-2a-4(l) likewise contemplates that acceptance of a plea 
is the same as entry of a plea. That provision states, "If... the court finds that the defendant 
has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance 
agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered* 
(emphasis added). That a plea in abeyance is entered when it is accepted by the court is also 
supported by Section 77-18-1(1) which states, "On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by 
a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in 
abeyance . . / ' (emphasis added). 
Defendant's distinction between "acceptance" and "entry" of a plea also makes little 
sense in view of the provisions of section 77-2a-3(2)(b) which allows a defendant who has 
successfully completed the terms of the plea agreement to withdraw his or her plea. As stated, 
a plea need not be withdrawn if it has never been entered. 
In keeping with the above-cited statutory language, this Court has also recognized, at 
least implicitly, that a plea in abeyance is entered when it is accepted by the trial court. In 
State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021, 1023 n.4 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996), 
the defendant argued that the trial court could not rely section 77-2a-3(7) to set aside his plea 
in abeyance for a sexual offense because that provision was not in effect at the time he 
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the date on which defendant committed the alleged offense is irrelevant to the 
application of section 77~2a-3(7). Section 77-2a-3(7) applies to the entrx of 
defendant's plea, not to defendant's criminal acts. Because the statute was 
enacted on May 3, 1993, it expressly applies to defendant's plea which - :• 
accepted on July 26, 1994. 
Id. In other words, for all intents and purposes, entry of a plea in abeyance is synonymous 
witl i acceptance of that plea. 
This Cot irt's precedent also contradicts defendant's si iggestion that a plea in abeyance 
is deemed entered only when judgment is entered. !*i v -'id^J defendant 
concedes as much . .. ; ,, ., .- , r n n . .x • ii >. * .:.. \ »:i 
i orrt\ t!\ \ L v v\i *}•*•<*
 : .... . i lefendant made * > : ica at the plea 
hearing. Defendant in effect challenges that view by asserting that the term "entry of the plea" 
is ambiguous in that it "could refer to the time ^ •.. . ^ ,, me defendant "enters a plea by stating 
no cc i itest • : m: gi :ilt> ' ' oi l tl ic n * •• ' the later tin le at \vl licl l the trial judge 
enters the plea in the court record as a judgment of conviction/ Br. Aple. 22 n.8.7 
i. . ..I; las expressly rejected deienaant :> \ icv. .;_L the acceptance or emr\ : a 
:• '*'• " ^ultanc ••:• ' .;cntan, . ' " L \ i in 
6Section 77-2a-3(7) provides: "No plea may be held in abeyance in any case 
involving a sexual offense against a victim who is under the age of 14." 
'"'",/ Although defendant suggests that Price was wrong in its assumption that ei lti y of 
a regular plea occurs at the plea hearing rather than at entry of the judgment of 
conviction, defendant nevertheless tells this Court that it "need not reconsider its 
conclusion in Price" because in this case defendant is relying on alternative grounds for 
affirmance of the trial court's ruling. Br. Aple. 22-23 n.8. The State therefore will not 
respond to defendant's challenge to Price other than to state that the reasoning in Price is 
sound and defendant has not provided a reasonable basis for overturning that decision. 
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abeyance and the entry of judgment of conviction and the imposition of sentence are not 
simultaneous events/* Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025 n.7. Indeed, as the Moss Court recognized, the 
plea in abeyance statutory scheme itself makes clear that the two events constitute separate 
occurrences. '"At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty . . . but prior to entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may.. . hold the plea in abeyance 
'" 14 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(l)) (emphasis added). 
Defendant's position that a plea in abeyance is not entered until entry of judgment is 
also unacceptable for policy reasons. Adoption of defendant's argument would in effect gut 
the plea in abeyance statute by allowing the defendant to take the plea in abeyance agreement 
for a test drive. If at any time before judgment is entered the defendant decides that the 
bargain is no longer to his or her liking, he or she could move to withdraw the plea even 
though a year or more had passed since its entry. A defendant who violates his agreement and 
has judgment entered against him will be particularly motivated to move to withdraw his plea. 
Thus, under defendant's argument, a defendant could move to withdraw a plea up to 30 days 
after entry of judgment no matter how long it has been since the defendant entered his or her 
original plea. Such a result undercuts the finality in plea taking that the 30-day limitation in 
section 77-13-6(2)(b) seeks to promote. 
On a final note, it is significant that section 77-13-6(2)(b) does not distinguish between 
regular pleas and pleas held in abeyance. Rather, that provision speaks only in terms of guilty 
and no contest pleas: "A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion 
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." Defendant does not suggest that 
her plea is anything other than a no contest plea. Indeed, the only difference between 
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defendant < pli i JII I i |i| i m il Hi lill iiii »ih • am m llul |ii I 'mnil ill! I i nk i 'd .1 MIII I 
defendant only if she does not comply with the terms of the plea agreement.8 Thus, b) its 
plain and literal terms, the 30-day limitation in section 77-13-6(2)(b) for withdrawing a no 
conies! plea applies h 1 tk tentiant . pli .1 
In sum. defendant's no contest plea, like an> other plea, was entered at the plea 
hearing when the trial court accepted it.9 Defendant's subsequent failure to move to withdraw 
l i e ! p k . i w i l i u m il l il.i , 1 l| ! l n p l u t I R J I I I I L ? i l q u i a i J I i l l , 1111.1 I , mil n l | i n i s i l u In m 1 1 l i . i i i I I 
alone grant her motion.1 
sIn a sense, plea m abeyance" is a misnomer, for it is not the plea that is held in 
abeyance, but rather the entry of the judgment and sentence that is held in abeyance. See 
Utah Code Ann §77-2a-U1). 
9Defendant suggests that the trial court ma\ not have "accepted" her plea because 
the court did not explicitly state that it had done so. However, the trial court's order 
appended to defendant's plea affidavit expressly states that defendant's plea was not only 
accepted, but it was also entered (R. 25). 
l0Defendant asserts in a footnote that if the 30-day limitation of section 77-13-
6(2)(b) ran from the plea proceeding for pleas in abeyance, pleas in abeyance could rarely 
be used because by agreement they almost always extend longer than 30 days. Br. Aple. 
32 n 10. Defendant ignores that the plea in abeyance statute expressly provides that a 
defendant may withdraw a plea within the time set by the plea in abeyance agreement if 
the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-2a-3; 77-2a-2(5). Thus, the plea in abeyance provisions operate as a statutory 
exception to the 30-day limitation in section 77-13-6(2)(b). Such an exception is not 
without precedent. See, e.g.. Price, 837 P.2d at 582 (acknowledging that although 
language of section 77-13-6-(2)(b) is unconditional, it is subject to an exception 
incorporated within rule 11 that defendant not be subject to the limitation period if he or 
she has not been advised of it). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HER PLEA WAS NOT AN ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 23, UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.11 
To circumvent the jurisdictional 30-day statutory limitation, defendant re-casts the trial 
court's order allowing her to withdraw her plea as an arrest of judgment under rule 23, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule provides: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment 
Defendant asserts that an arrest of judgment was proper in this case because 1) defendant's 
admitted conduct did not constitute a public offense and 2) the trial court did not strictly 
comply with rule 11 and this constitutes "good cause" for arresting judgment. 
Defendant's characterization of the trial court's ruling as an arrest of judgment is 
erroneous. It is clear from the record that the trial court's ruling was in fact the granting of a 
motion to withdraw a plea. Defendant should not be permitted to circumvent a legislative 
jurisdictional time limitation merely by re-labeling the nature of a trial court's ruling. 
Moreover, an arrest of judgment would not be appropriate in this case because the facts 
admitted to by defendant constitute the public offense of attempted theft. In addition, failure 
to strictly comply with rule 11 does not amount to "good cause" for an arrest of judgment. 
A. The record does not support defendant's characterization of the trial court's 
ruling as an arrest of judgment 
Defendant acknowledges that neither the trial court nor the parties referred to rule 23 
nThis point responds to Point LB. of defendant's brief, pages 21-30. 
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or iisnl llit" Iri'in "mirs! ol fiiiitiiiiait Hi i \\*W '"! n '" Sin in \ nilinless asserts tl lattl le ti ial 
judge based his ruling allowing her to withdraw her plea on a belief that defendant's conduct 
was not a crime and that this m L licet amounted to an arrest of judgment , • \riL. _ 
In other words ddWnl nil in MIMICS III ill lllin1 In ill i ml ill i f lr i I loiind III il "llir tin Is idmillt ill ilo 
ilot constitute a public offense.'' 
Defendant's argument that the trial court in substance arrested judgment is contradicted 
1 • * • 
the issue as a motion to withdraw7 a plea and not as one to arrest judgment. .See State v. 
Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 977-78 (Utah App. 1988) (court looked at nature of proceedings below 
t > dot ). 
At the beginning of the hearing allowing defendant to withdraw her plea, the trial court 
summarized for the record a conversation held in chambers between defense counsel, the 
proseculiu 11111 Id mil ill1 hli-hl m i ' ti.iiisu ipl ol illiii In mini? in mt.iinrd in Atlldni illliii 
D). The trial court alluded to correspondence from the employer that suggested that defendant 
owed approximately $687.00 in restitution once offsets for earned commissions had been 
In any event to continue the discussion further, I expressed to the State 
that I had some serious reservations about allowing the plea to stand if this was 
simply an accounting matter between parties and . . . a civil matter that should 
be resolved in the civil court because you feel that there in fact was a class A 
misdemeanor to which she pled. 
In fact, I thought it was a third degree felony, but I see now in my 
information she pled to an attempted theft. Which is a class A. That even so, 
I would not be inclined, as I recall our discussion, to put somebody in the state 
prison for zero to five on such a circumstance. That was our discussion. 
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At that point I think, Mr. Brown [defense counsel], you indicated that 
perhaps your client would want to... withdraw the plea, and we would then set 
it for trial. 
(R. 62) (emphasis added). Both parties acknowledged that this was an accurate representation 
of the in-chambers discussion (R. 62). At that point, the prosecutor objected to defendant's 
being allowed to withdraw her plea on the ground that it was untimely under section 77-13-16 
(R. 63). The prosecutor cited to State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) in support of 
his objection (R. 63). The prosecutor also pointed out that defendant had to first make a 
request to withdraw her plea (R. 63). 
The trial court then turned to defense counsel and asked, "Is it your request to withdraw 
thepleaT Defense counsel responded, i%Well, I'm a little surprised. Because I think last time 
when we were discussing it Mr. Jones [the prosecutor] said, 'Well, let's just set it for trial'" 
(R. 63) (emphasis added). Defense counsel then asserted that, based on the information before 
the court, defendant did not have the requisite intent and that the matter should have been 
litigated civilly (R. 64). Defense counsel stated, "If the court's not inclined to take the 
withdrawal of the plea, I guess we'll have to deal with that" (R. 64) (emphasis added). 
The trial court conceded that it was not familiar with Price, but told defense counsel, 
"If you file a motion to withdraw the plea, I believe there's good cause for allowing the plea 
to be withdrawn" (id.) (emphasis added). The court then stated, "Then the court will authorize 
the withdrawal of the plea, and deny the objection of the state. So that plea is withdrawn and 
stricken in this case. Now, I assume that takes us back, for technical reasons, back to the theft, 
a third degree felony which was the original charge in the information" (id.) (emphasis added). 
When the State expressed its intention to appeal, the trial court reaffirmed its ruling, but 
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m\ siw,: me parties to f lesl IC i it the i ecoi dby tl lepi o aiding tl lecoi n t " 'it! 11 :t 1 : i e in: lfoi i :t latioi i (I <! 
65-66). The court further explained its ruling by stating, 
" \ o u want, Mr. Brown, to file a motion t- withdraw the plea, or if 
you're satisfied with the record, I 'm satisfied with the discussion that I had that 
I 'm not comfortable accepting a plea. It was a no contest plea; it was not an 
admission of guilt, and I 'm just not going to be happy with a plea under those 
circumstances 
I first thought that she had — basically the charge may have been — even 
been a little inaccurate in the sense that it was charged as a theft, when in fact 
it probably should have been charged as embezzling, I suppose. She had the 
lawful right to have the checks which she deposited into her account. 
And then there was this offsetting situation. So I don tknow. I he case 
is just an uncomfortable case for me. I 'm not willing to send somebody to 
prison and allow the potential that they will go to prison on the basis of the 
record I now have, 
H"" Km>o. - 'ei i ic in istrates tl ial: the ti ial " i :" "1 1 * • - / * »be, an 
order granting the withdrawal of defendant's plea. It wa *:ie defendam who i chambers 
stated bhe wanted ^ withdraw her plea, i he \\ ud court understood ma; m*- WJ > UIL idich 
to withdraw the plea. Indeed, at one point the trial court specifically asked defendant if she 
wanted u-- withdraw her plea, i MA^.U. W^ :tl^ vwurt > ruling itself stated that it was allowing 
the defendai it t :»in • :ih // 2 1 i;" her pi a^ . • 
Equally clear is that the trial court was not suggesting that defendant's conduct did not 
constitute a public offense, a ground foi arresting judgmei it Ylthough tl le ti ial court 
expressed its b ^ lieftl lattl lei 1 latter 1: 1 ligl it ha v ebeen 01 ieofbookkee°i'"' * .11-4, p-.--'-^  -- ]_"•' u 
have been handled civilly, it never indicated that the alleged conduct, if proved, did not 
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constitute a public offense. In fact, the trial court recognized that because the record had not 
been fully developed and there were apparently disputed facts, it was not in a position to make 
such a ruling. To that end, the court stated, "I'm not willing to send somebody to prison and 
allow the potential that they will go to prison on the basis of the record I now have" (R. 66) 
(emphasis added). See Smith. 812 P.2d at 479 (State does not fully develop evidence when 
plea entered, therefore defendant may not engage in after-the-fact speculation that State could 
not have carried burden). The trial court further noted the potential criminality of defendant's 
conduct by observing that perhaps defendant should have been charged with embezzling 
instead of theft (R. 66). 
It is also significant that after allowing the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court 
reinstated the third degree felony charge so that the State could bring the matter to trial (R. 64). 
This demonstrates that the trial court believed that defendant's conduct as alleged by the stated 
constituted a crime. 
In sum, the record establishes that the trial court's ruling was not an arrest of judgment, 
but a grant of a motion to withdraw a plea. The 30-day limitation was therefore applicable to 
defendant's motion. 
B. No proper grounds existed for granting an arrest of judgment under rule 23. 
Defendant argues that this Court may nevertheless affirm the trial court's ruling under 
rule 23 because "good cause" existed for arresting judgment in this case. Specifically, 
defendant asserts that there was no factual basis to support her plea and that the trial court 
failed to strictly comply with rule 11. Both these claims are without merit. 
Factual basis. Contrary to defendant's assertions, there was a factual basis to support 
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her plea. A person commits theft if he or she 1) to obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
2) over the property of another 3) with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404( 1995). The information tracked the statutory elements, stating that defendant 
"obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Cooks Books with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $ 1,000, 
but less than $5,000" (R. 05). The probable cause statement elaborated, 
The Defendant deposited three checks into her account at Utah Central 
Credit Union which belonged to Cooks' Books. The Defendant was not 
authorized to keep the money which totaled over $ 1,400.00. The checks were 
issued between August 10 and Sept 7, 1994. The Defendant was employed by 
Cooks Books but resigned on August 1, 1994. 
(R. 06). 
In her plea affidavit, defendant admitted that she "attempted to exercise unauthorized 
control over the property of Cook's Books with the purpose to deprive the owner and the value 
exceeds $1,000 but less than $5,000." The prosecutor further stated at the plea hearing that 
while defendant had been working for a book company, she kept and cashed checks that 
should have been sent to her employer (R. 48). 
Taken together, these facts form an ample basis for defendant's plea. Although 
defendant, through counsel, suggested that she believed that she was entitled to appropriate 
the checks because her employer owed her money, that fact does not negate or undermine the 
factual basis of the plea. First, by pleading "no contest," defendant in effect opted to not 
challenge the State's allegations. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(3) (plea of no contest 
"indicates the accused does not challenge the charges in the information," and if accepted by 
court has same effect as guilty plea). Therefore, the State's allegations as contained in the 
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information must be accepted as true for purposes of determining whether there was a factual 
basis. 
Second, it is no defense to theft that the actor has an interest in the property "stolen if 
another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-402(2) (1995). See also State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 590-91 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Thus, even assuming that defendant's employer owed 
her money, defendant was not entitled to a self-help remedy by taking and cashing checks that 
were not hers. It is telling in this case that defendant apparently took far more than the 
commissions she was allegedly owed and that she has yet to pay back the difference. 
Moreover, the defendant's and trial court's suggestion that this is a civil matter as opposed to 
a criminal one is beside the point. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have indicated 
that the existence of a civil remedy does not excuse criminal conduct. Larsen, 834 P.2d at 
591; State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 691 (Utah 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1995). 
In view of the foregoing, there was a sufficient factual basis to support defendant's 
plea. 
Rule 11. Defendant invites this Court to hold that the failure to strictly comply with 
rule 11 always constitutes "good cause" to arrest judgment. Defendant argues that such a rule 
is necessary for the efficient administration of justice. 
Such a rule would in effect nullify the jurisdictional statutory 30-day limitation in 
section 77-13-6(2)(b) for withdrawing a plea. Under defendant's argument, a defendant could 
always withdraw a plea even years after entry of that plea so long as he or she could show the 
24 
lack of strict compliance with rule 11. 
Rule 23 was never intended to act as a substitute for a timely motion to withdraw a plea 
or to circumvent the jurisdictional time limits for filing such a motion. "At common law, an 
arrest of judgment was the trial court's act of refusing to enter judgment on a verdict because 
of some error appearing on the face oaf the record that rendered the judgment invalid.*' 
Owens, 753 P.2d at 978. Failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does not in and of itself render 
a "judgment invalid. A plea is invalid only if it is not knowing or involuntary. As the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized in Salazar v. Warden. 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993), failure 
to strictly comply with rule 11 does not in itself amount to a constitutional violation of a 
defendant's rights, nor does it necessarily mean that the plea is unknowing or involuntary. 
In short, failure to comply with rule 11 is not the type of error that rule 23 was intended 
to correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial 
court's grating of defendant's motion to withdraw her no contest plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Xf* day of SzjJ-fj^A^ . 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
(JAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM D 
Transcript of Hearing in Which Defendant Withdrew her Plea 
2 NOVEMBER 6, 1997 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
3 P R 0 C E E D I N G S . 
4 (COMMENCING AT 8:30 A.M.) 
5 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING. THIS IS THE TIME 
6 SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER THE STATE OF 
7 UTAH VERSUS LINDA ANETTE KALMAR, 971900756. THIS 
8 ISS TIME SET FOR A RESTITUTION HEARING. COUNSEL, 
9 FIRST, WILL YOU EACH STATE YOUR APPEARANCES. 
10 MR. BROWN: LYNN BROWN APPEARING ON BEHALF 
11 OF MS. KALMAR. 
12 MR. JONES: ERNEST JONES ON BEHALF OF THE 
13 STATE. 
14 THE COURT: WHAT'S ANTICIPATED TODAY? 
15 MR. BROWN: I GUESS WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT IT 
16 A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO, I GUESS WE DECIDED TO SET IT 
17 FOR A TRIAL. 
18 THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S MAKE A RECORD OF 
19 THE DISCUSSION, SO THAT WE HAVE FORMAL RECORD. THE 
20 RECORD SHOULD SHOW -- AND IF YOU HAVE A DIFFERENT 
21 RECOLLECTION, PLEASE HELP ME OR EXPAND UPON THE 
22 RECOLLECTION OF YOUR OWN INFORMATION -- THAT AT THE 
23 REQUEST, I THINK, OF MR. BROWN, BOTH THE PROSECUTOR 
24 AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY MET WITH THE COURT A FEW DAYS 
25 AGO AND DISCUSSED AN ISSUE REGARDING THE DIFFICULTY 
1 OF DETERMINING THE RESTITUTION. 
2 THE ISSUE WAS THAT APPARENTLY AT THE TIME 
3 THAT THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A NO CONTEST PLEA, WHICH 
4 WAS ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER, '97, THAT AT THAT TIME 
5 THE DEFENDANT, IT WAS ALLEGED BY THE COMPANY -- I 
6 THINK IT WAS A COMPANY CALLED COOK PUBLISHING. 
7 MR. BROWN: COOKS BOOKS. 
8 THE COURT: COOKS BOOKS. ANYWAY, A 
9 PUBLISHING COMPANY FOR WHICH SHE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
10 EMPLOYED, HAD INDICATED AND ALLEGED TO THE 
11 PROSECUTION THAT SHE HAD TAKEN IMPROPERLY SOME 
12 CHECKS AND DEPOSITED THEM TO HER ACCOUNT, AND IT WAS 
13 ABOUT $1,500. 
14 THERE WAS THEN A DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT SHE 
15 OWED THEM MONEY AND THEY OWED HER MONEY, THAT THERE 
16 WAS REALLY A NEED FOR AN ACCOUNTING. AND THAT WAS 
17 THE ISSUE OF THE RESTITUTION. 
18 THE COMPANY THEN SENT SOME OTHER RECENT 
19 CORRESPONDENCE THAT YOU HAD AND REFERRED TO AT THE 
20 TIME WE WERE MEETING IN MY CHAMBERS, AND INDICATED 
21 THAT IN FACT THE NET OBLIGATION AFTER THEY OFFSET 
22 THE COMMISSIONS THEY OWED HER AND THE MONEY THAT SHE 
23 OWED THEM, AND SO ON, WAS SOMETHING LIKE $687 
24 DOLLARS, IF I RECALL FROM THE DISCUSSION. 
25 MR. BROWN: THAT'S PRETTY CLOSE, YES. 
1 THE COURT: IN ANY EVENT, TO CONTINUE THE 
2 DISCUSSION FURTHER, I EXPRESSED TO THE STATE THAT I 
3 HAD SOME SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING THE 
4 PLEA TO STAND IF THIS WAS SIMPLY AN ACCOUNTING 
5 MATTER BETWEEN PARTIES AND NOT AND A CIVIL MATTER 
6 THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THE CIVIL COURT BECAUSE 
7 YOU FEEL THAT THERE IN FACT WAS A CLASS A. 
8 MISDEMEANOR TO WHICH SHE PLED. 
9 IN FACT, I THOUGHT IT WAS A THIRD DEGREE 
10 FELONY, BUT I SEE NOW IN MY INFORMATION SHE PLED TO 
11 AN ATTEMPTED THEFT. WHICH IS A CLASS A. THAT EVEN 
12 SO, I WOULD NOT BE INCLINED, AS I RECALL OUR 
13 DISCUSSION, TO PUT SOMEBODY IN THE STATE PRISON FOR 
14 ZERO TO FIVE ON SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE. THAT WAS OUR 
15 DISCUSSION. 
16 AT THAT POINT I THINK, MR. BROWN, YOU 
17 INDICATED THAT PERHAPS YOUR CLIENT WOULD WANT TO TO 
18 WITHDRAW THE PLEA, AND WE WOULD THEN SET IT FOR 
19 TRIAL. 
20 NOW, IS THAT A AN ACCURATE REPRESENTATION 
21 OF 'OUR DISCUSSION? 
22 MR. BROWN: I THINK THAT'S FAIRLY ACCURATE. 
23 THE COURT: MR. JONES? 
24 MR. JONES: I THINK THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR 
2 5 HONOR. 
2__ 
1 THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT EITHER 
2 OF YOU WISH TO ADD TO THE RECORD? 
3 MR. BROWN: NO. 
4 MR. JONES: THERE IS. AND THAT IS, I JUST 
5 DON'T THINK AT THIS POINT IN TIME AT THAT THE 
6 DEFENDANT CAN WITHDRAW THE PLEA. AS YOU HAVE 
7 ALREADY POINTED OUT, SHE ENTERED A NO CONTEST PLEA 
8 ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER. WE'RE ALMOST TWO MONTHS 
9 BEYOND THAT POINT NOW ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER. IF I 
10 READ THE STATUTE CORRECTLY, 77-13-6, SHE HAS TO MAKE 
11 A REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THAT PLEA, AND I BELIEVE IT 
12 HAS TO DONE WITHIN 3 0 DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN. 
13 THERE IS A CASE CALLED STATE VERSUS PRICE, 
14 837 PACIFIC 2D, 578. I THINK ONCE THE 30 DAYS IS UP 
15 SHE CANNOT WITHDRAW THE PLEA. SO I WOULD SIMPLY ASK 
16 THE COURT TO DENY THE REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA 
17 AT THIS POINT. 
18 THE COURT: IS IT YOUR REQUEST TO WITHDRAW 
19 THE PLEA? 
20 MR. BROWN: WELL, I'M A LITTLE SURPRISED. 
21 BECAUSE I THINK LAST TIME WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING IT 
22 MR. JONES SAID, "WELL, LET'S JUST SET IT FOR TRIAL." 
23 SO I DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS GOING TO BE ANY 
24 PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THAT. 
25 THE COURT: I SEE. 
. 2JL 
1 MR. BROWN: BUT AS I INDICATED TO THE 
2 COURT, THE INFORMATION THAT WE RECEIVED MAKES IT 
3 VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL INTENT 
4 INVOLVED HERE. AND IT'S SIMPLY A MATTER THAT SHOULD 
5 HAVE BEEN LITIGATED IN THE CIVIL COURTS. 
6 IF THE COURT'S NOT INCLINED TO TAKE THE 
7 WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, I GUESS WE'LL HAVE TO DEAL 
8 WITH THAT. 
9 THE COURT: I CERTAINLY HAVEN'T READ THIS 
10 RECENT CASE. I DO KNOW WHEN WE ADVISE PEOPLE THAT 
11 GO THROUGH THE COLLOQUY OF A PLEA THAT WE DO 
12 INDICATE THAT THEY CAN WITHDRAW THEIR PLEA ANY TIME 
13 WITHIN 30 DAYS. 
14 I WILL TELL YOU THAT IF YOU FILE A MOTION 
15 TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, I BELIEVE THERE'S GOOD CAUSE 
16 FOR ALLOWING THE PLEA TO BE WITHDRAWN. 
17 MR. BROWN: I DIDN'T KNOW THERE WAS GOING 
18 TO BE ANY ISSUE ABOUT THAT. 
19 THE COURT: THEN THE COURT WILL AUTHORIZE 
20 THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA, AND DENY THE OBJECTION 
21 OF THE STATE. SO THAT PLEA IS WITHDRAWN AND 
22 STRICKEN IN THIS CASE. NOW, I ASSUME THAT TAKES US 
23 BACK, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, BACK TO THE THEFT, A 
24 THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHICH WAS THE ORIGINAL CHARGE IN 
25 THE INFORMATION. 
. 22. 
1 MR. JONES: IN LIGHT OF YOUR RULING, IF YOU 
2 ARE GOING TO ALLOW HER TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA, I WOULD 
3 SUGGEST THAT RATHER THAN SET IT FOR TRIAL, IF YOU 
4 WOULD SET IT OVER FOR 30 DAYS TO GIVE ME AN 
5 OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT WE WANT TO 
6 APPEAL THE COURT'S RULING. 
7 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
8 MR. JONES: I DO THINK THE STATUTE ALLOWS 
9 THE STATE TO APPEAL THAT PARTICULAR PROVISION. BUT 
10 I THINK RATHER THAN SETTING IT FOR TRIAL, I WOULD 
11 LIKE SOME TIME TO THE LOOK AT THAT. 
12 THE COURT: OKAY. ANY OBJECTION TO THAT? 
13 MR. BROWN: NO. 
14 THE COURT: OKAY. I DON'T HAVE ANY 
15 OBJECTION TO THAT EITHER. LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY: I 
16 HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TO YOU WHAT I AM INCLINED TO 
17 DO. I DID THAT IN MY CHAMBERS EARLIER, AND I'M A 
18 LITTLE CONCERNED AS TO WHETHER WE FLESHED OUT THE 
19 LAW ADEQUATELY FOR THE ISSUES ON APPEAL. MR. JONES, 
20 YOU BRING UP YOUR ARGUMENT AT THAT POINT REFERRING 
21 TO-THIS CASE AS 837 PAC. 2D 578, I THINK YOU SAID. 
22 MR. JONES: YES. 
23 THE COURT: WHICH OF COURSE I HAVEN'T READ 
24 RECENTLY, 
25 MR. JONES: IF YOU WANT TO TAKE IT UNDER 
2JL 
1 ADVISEMENT --
2 THE COURT: I REALLY DON'T. I'M GOING TO 
3 RULE THIS WAY, BUT I AM JUST WONDERING IF YOU WANT 
4 TO FLESH IT OUT BY ANY OTHER PLEADINGS. 
5 IF YOU WANT, MR. BROWN, TO FILE A MOTION TO 
6 WITHDRAW THE PLEA, OR IF YOU'RE SATISFIED WITH THE 
7 RECORD, I'M SATISFIED WITH THE DISCUSSION THAT I HAD 
8 THAT I'M NOT COMFORTABLE ACCEPTING A PLEA. IT WAS A 
9 NO CONTEST PLEA; IT WAS NOT AN ADMISSION OF GUILT, 
10 AND I'M JUST NOT GOING TO BE HAPPY WITH A PLEA UNDER 
11 THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
12 I FIRST THOUGHT THAT SHE HAD -- BASICALLY 
13 THE CHARGE MAY HAVE BEEN -- EVEN BEEN A LITTLE 
14 INNACURATE IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS CHARGED AS A 
15 THEFT, WHEN IN FACT IT PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
16 CHARGED AS EMBEZZLING, I SUPPOSE. SHE HAD THE 
17 LAWFUL RIGHT TO HAVE THE CHECKS WHICH SHE DEPOSITED 
18 INTO HER ACCOUNT. 
19 AND THEN THERE WAS THIS OFF-SETTING 
20 SITUATION. SO I DON'T KNOW. THE CASE IS JUST AN 
21 UNCOMFORTABLE CASE FOR ME. I'M NOT WILLING TO SEND 
22 SOMEBODY TO PRISON AND ALLOW THE POTENTIAL THAT THEY 
23 WILL GO TO PRISON ON THE BASIS OF THE RECORD I KNOW 
2 4 HAVE. 
25 THAT MEANS THAT BOTH OF YOU MAY DISCOVER 
. . 2JL 
1 AND GIVE ME OTHER INFORMATION HEREAFTER. SO THE 
2 PLEA IS WITHDRAWN. I'LL GIVE YOU 30 DAYS TO 
3 CONSIDER WHETHER TO APPEAL THE MATTER. THAT WOULD 
4 MEAN THAT TODAY IS THE 6TH ARE NOVEMBER, SO HOW 
5 ABOUT YOU FILE YOUR NOTICE OF READINESS ON OR BEFORE 
6 DECEMBER 5TH, WHICH IS A FRIDAY. OR NOTICE OF 
7 APPEAL, WHICH IS A FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, WHICH IS A 
8 FRIDAY. 
9 SHALL WE NOW SET THE CASE FOR REVIEW ON 
10 DECEMBER 8 SO THAT WE DON'T LET IT GET LOST IN THE 
11 FILING SYSTEM? 
12 MR. BROWN: IS THAT ON YOUR REGULAR 
13 CALENDAR? 
14 THE COURT: A SIMPLE REVIEW ON MONDAY 
15 MORNING. DECEMBER 8. AND IF THE CASE IS GOING TO 
16 GO FURTHER, BE RETURNED BACK FOR FOR TRIAL, WE'LL 
17 SET THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL AT THAT TIME, OR WE'LL 
18 RESOLVE IT, HOWEVER YOU DETERMINE. 
19 MR. JONES: THE SECTION OF THE CODE THAT I 
20 CITED WAS 77-13-6. TALKS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA. 
21 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. WELL, I WILL 
22 CONSIDER THIS CASE NEXT ON DECEMBER 8 FOR REVIEW. 
2 3 MR. BROWN: THANKS, JUDGE. 
24 THE COURT: THANK YOU EACH. THE COURT'S IN 
25 RECESS. WILL YOU PREPARE AN ORDER, MR. BROWN, 
2_5_ 
1 WITHDRAWING THE PLEA, DOING WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID 
2 TODAY. 
3 MR. BROWN: YES. 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. 
5 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AND COURT IN RECESS 
6 AT 8:50 A.M.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH : 
3 I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
4 I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND 
5 REPORTER AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER IN THE 
6 STATE OF UTAH HEREBY CERTIFY: 
7 THAT I AM AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
8 THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
9 THAT I WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE 
10 PROCEEDINGS IN THE BEFORE -ENTITLED CAUSE; 
11 THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED 
12 STENOGRAPHICALLY BY ME, AND WERE THEREAFTER 
13 TRANSCRIBED. 
14 THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE 
15 BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
16 PROCEEDINGS HAD 
17 IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY 
18 I NAME AND SEAL THIS 26TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1998. 
19 
20 
21 | GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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ADDENDUM E 
Transcript of Plea Hearing 
1 
2 SEPTEMBER 15, 1997 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
3 
4 P R O C E E D I N G S 
5 THE COURT: STATE VERSUS LINDA ANNETTE 
6 KALMAR. CASE NO. 971900756 FS. APPEARANCES, PLEASE. 
7 MR. BROWN: LYNN BROWN APPEARING ON BEHALF 
8 OF MS. KALMAR. 
9 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. BROWN. AND FOR 
10 THE STATE? 
11 MR. JONES: EARNEST JONES FOR THE STATE. 
12 THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. JONES. 
13 MR. BROWN: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE RESOLVED 
14 THIS MATTER WITH A PLEA TO A CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR. 
15 NO CONTEST. AND WE HAVE A PLEA IN ABEYANCE FORM OR 
16 AGREEMENT THAT WE NEED TO GO OVER WITH THE COURT. 
17 COULD WE DO THAT? 
18 THE COURT: I DON'T CARE MUCH FOR PLEAS IN 
19 ABEYANCE. WE HAVE JUST DONE IT LAST WEEK, AND I AM 
2 0 SURE IT'S A STATUTORY CONCEPT THAT HAS TO BE ALLOWED 
21 TO 'PARTIES, SO WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT. 
22 BUT THE STATUS OF THE FILE DURING THE 
23 PERIOD OF THE ABEYANCE, I DON'T WANT IT TO BE AN 
24 OPEN CASE. I WANT BE TO A CLOSED FILE, BECAUSE IT'S 
25 RESOLVED BY THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE, SO IT DOESN'T 
4 
STAND AS A CASE PENDING FOR A YEAR ON THE CASE 
PENDING FILE. 
Q. (BY MR. BROWN) WELL, I ANTICIPATED IT TO 
BE-- WHAT WE WOULD WANT IS, THE ONLY ISSUE HERE IS A 
QUESTION OF WHO OWES WHO MONEYS. A QUESTION OF 
RESTITUTION. AFTER THE RESTITUTION HEARING, WE HAVE 
PROVIDED THAT IF SHE SHE OWES NO RESTITUTION, OR IF 
THEY OWE HER MONEY, THEN THE CASE IS TO BE 
DISMISSED. I THINK IT WILL BE --
THE COURT: SO WE NEED TO SET A RESTITUTION 
HEARING? 
MR. BROWN: THAT'S CORRECT? 
THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. ARE YOU 
COMFORTABLE WITH THE AGREEMENT, THEN? 
MR. JONES: YES, I AM. AND WE HAVE GONE 
OVER THE AGREEMENT, JUDGE. IT'S SATISFACTORY. 
IT'S IN WRITING. LET ME, IF I COULD, JUST EXPLAIN 
TO THE COURT WHY WE'RE USING A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IN 
THIS CASE. 
THIS CASE OCCURRED IN AUGUST OF 19 94. AND 
IT WAS NOT EVEN BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION FOR ALMOST 
A YEAR, SO WE STARTED DOING PROSECUTION OR THE 
INVESTIGATION IN '95. FOR SOME REASON SHE WAS NOT 
EVEN PICKED UP ON IT UNTIL MAY OF 1997, SO THE CASE 
IS RATHER OLD. 
MOST OF THE WITNESSES WE HAVE ON THE CASE 
WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM OUT OF STATE, WHICH 
CERTAINLY INCURS A REAL EXPENSE FOR US. THE 
RESTITUTION IN THIS CASE, AT LEAST FROM OUR 
STANDPOINT, IS AROUND $1,500. SO WHEN YOU START 
COMPARING THE COST OF PROSECUTION AND THE AMOUNT OF 
RESTITUTION, IT'S PROBABLY A FAIR RESOLUTION OF THE 
MATTER. 
THE OTHER THING, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING SHE 
DOES NOT HAVE A PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD. SHE WAS 
WORKING FOR A BOOK COMPANY, AND FROM OUR STANDPOINT, 
SHE TOOK SOME CHECKS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO 
THE COMPANY, AND INSTEAD KEPT THOSE AND CASHED 
THOSE. SO I THINK IT'S REALLY CASE OF POOR 
JUDGEMENT ON HER PART. 
THE COURT: WELL, THEN, WHY DO WE WANT 
TO -- WHY DON'T WE HAVE THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
FIRST AND THEN SEE WHAT WE DO WITH THE CASE? 
MR. JONES: WELL, I THINK SHE'S WILLING TO 
DO THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE SO WE GET THE ISSUES OF 
GUILT OR INNOCENCE OUT OF THE WAY. AND WE'LL JUST 
BRING IN THE EVIDENCE ON THE RESTITUTION TO 
DETERMINE HOW MUCH IF ANY IS OWING. 
THE COURT: BUT THE PLEA IS NO CONTEST. 
MR. JONES: NO CONTEST. THAT'S RIGHT. 
1 THE COURT: WHICH DOESN'T -- I MEAN, I WILL 
2 ACCEPT IT AS THOUGH IT WERE A GUILTY PLEA, BUT IT'S 
3 REALLY NOT A ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. SHE'S NOT - - AS I GET 
4 THE FEEL FOR THIS CASE, FOR WHATEVER THAT'S WORTH, 
5 MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE STATE IS NOT INTERESTED IN 
6 PROSECUTING HER. IF YOU WENT THROUGH THE EVIDENCE 
7 AND YOU FOUND OUT THAT, INDEED, THEY OWED HER MONEY, 
8 YOU WOULDN'T WANT TO PROSECUTE HER. 
9 MR. JONES: RIGHT. THAT'S WHY WE'RE 
10 WILLING -- IF THE COURT DETERMINES THERE IS NO 
11 RESTITUTION OWING, I THINK WE ARE GOING TO 
12 ESSENTIALLY DISMISS THE CASE. SO I DON'T THINK 
13 THAT'S THE WAY IT'S GOING TO COME DOWN, BUT --
14 THE COURT: AND OF COURSE WE DON'T KNOW 
15 THAT. 
16 MR. JONES: RIGHT. 
17 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO 
18 HAVING THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING FIRST? 
19 MR. JONES: I JUST -- TO US, THE ONLY ISSUE 
20 IS RESTITUTION. HOW MUCH, IF ANY, IS OWING. AND WE 
21 THOUGHT BY DOING A PLEA IN ABEYANCE, WE COULD 
22 RESOLVE THAT AND JUST GET TO THE RESTITUTION 
23 QUESTION. 
24 THE COURT: AND I SUPPOSE THAT THERE ARE 
25 PROBLEMS WITH THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OR OTHER PROBLEMS 
1 IN TERMS OF A RESTITUTION HEARING IF YOU HAVEN'T 
2 DEALT WITH THE PLEA. 
3 MR. JONES: RIGHT. THAT COULD BE, YES. 
4 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO YOU'RE 
5 COMFORTABLE WITH THIS AGREEMENT. 
6 MR. BROWN: THAT'S WHAT WE AGREED TO, YES. 
7 THE COURT: OKAY. FINE. ALL RIGHT. 
8 MS. KALMAR, DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT'AS BEING 
9 SREQUESTED HERE OF THE COURT? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
11 THE COURT: YOU'RE ASKING, THROUGH YOUR 
12 COUNSEL, THAT I AUTHORIZE YOU TO ENTER WHAT'S CALLED 
13 A PLEA IN ABEYANCE, WHICH MEANS THAT YOU WILL ENTER 
14 A PLEA TITLED "NO CONTEST", BUT IT WOULD BE 
15 INTERPRETED BY ME AS AN ADMISSION OF OF GUILT IN THE 
16 EVENT I LATER HAD TO REVIEW THIS FOR SOME REASON. 
17 IN OTHER WORDS, I COULD TREAT IT AS THOUGH 
18 IT WERE A GUILTY PLEA WHEN IT'S A NO CONTEST PLEA. 
19 I KNOW THAT SOUNDS A BIT CONFUSING. 
20 MR. BROWN: I EXPLAINED TO HER THAT IT HAS 
21 THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS A GUILTY PLEA. YOU CAN 
22 DO THE SAME THING THAT YOU COULD ON THIS AS A GUILTY 
23 PLEA. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS, SHE DOESN'T ADMIT ANY 
24 CULPABILITY OR WRONG-DOING. 
25 THE COURT: RIGHT. SO WHAT SHE'S CLAIMING 
1 IS THAT WHATEVER ERRORS WERE MADE WERE BOOKKEEPING 
2 PROBLEMS OR SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE. 
3 MR. BROWN: YEAH. WE'LL GET INTO THAT IN 
4 THE RESTITUTION HEARING. 
5 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. IF I ACCEPT 
6 YOUR PLEA TO NO CONTEST ON THIS CASE, YOU'RE WAIVING 
7 ALL OF YOUR RIGHTS TO TRIAL. THAT MEANS THAT FROM 
8 THIS POINT ON, THERE WOULD BE NO TRIAL. THE STATE 
9 WOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO CALL WITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
10 AGAINST YOU, YOU WOULD WAIVE YOUR RIGHTS OF SILENCE, 
11 AND ACKNOWLEDGE AT LEAST WHAT HAPPENED HERE, SO THAT 
12 WE COULD GET TO THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. DO YOU 
13 UNDERSTAND THAT? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: I UNDERSTAND THAT, WITH THE 
15 PROVISO THAT WE'LL HAVE THE RESTITUTION HEARING. 
16 THE COURT: YES. 
17 MR. JONES: AND THAT I CAN OFFER EVIDENCE 
18 AT THAT TIME. 
19 THE COURT: THAT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD. OKAY. 
20 HAVE YOU BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE OF YOUR 
21 ATTORNEY, MR. BROWN? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
23 THE COURT: ARE YOU AT THIS TIME UNDER THE 
24 INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUG, ALCOHOL, NARCOTIC, OR 
25 ANYTHING THAT WOULD IMPAIR YOUR JUDGMENT? 
1 THE DEFENDANT: COUPLE OF ASPIRIN. 
2 THE COURT: COUPLE OF ASPIRIN. DO THEY 
3 IMPAIR YOUR JUDGMENT? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: I DON'T THINK SO. 
5 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND DO YOU FEEL 
6 CAPABLE OF PROCEEDING? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
8 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN TO THE AMENDED 
9 INFORMATION, THEFT, A CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR -- ARE WE 
10 AMENDING THE AMOUNT, MR. JONES? 
11 MR. JONES: YES. 
12 MR. BROWN: I HAVE MADE IT AN INTENT. 
13 THE COURT: OKAY? 
14 MR. JONES: OKAY. 
15 THE COURT: INCHOATE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED 
16 THEFT, AND THEN THE AMOUNT STAYS? 
17 MR. BROWN: YES. 
18 THE COURT: OKAY. AND THE PENALTY FOR A 
19 CLASS A. MISDEMEANOR MAY BE ONE YEAR IN THE COUNTY 
20 JAIL AND A FINE OF OF $2,500. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
2 1 THAT? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: YES, UH-HUH. 
23 THE COURT: TO THIS OFFENSE, DO YOU PLEAD 
24 GUILTY, NOT GUILTY, OR NO CONTEST? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: NO CONTEST. 
UL 
1 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HOW LONG WILL THE 
2 RESTITUTION HEARING TAKE, AND ARE YOU READY TO 
3 PROCEED WITH IT? 
4 MR. JONES: PROBABLY A COUPLE OF HOURS. 
5 ... MR. BROWN: IT COULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME. I 
6 I HAVE TO GET SOME OF THE RECORDS FROM THIS COMPANY, 
7 WHICH IS OUT OF STATE, SO --
8 THE COURT: YOU WANT SOME TIME TO SET IT. 
9 MR. BROWN: I WILL WANT SOME TIME. SOME 
10 TIME. PROBABLY ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. IF I 
11 COULD, TO DEAL WITH THAT. BECAUSE I'M GOING TO HAVE 
12 TO DIG UP SOME RECORDS AND OLD CHECKS FOR 
13 COMMISSIONS THAT THEY HAVE PAID TO HER. SO I HAVE 
14 GOT TO DIG UP ALL THE FINANCIAL RECORDS. SO THAT 
15 COULD GO BACK A WHILE. 
16 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH 
17 THOSE DATES, MR. JONES? 
18 MR. JONES: NO. THAT'S FINE, YOUR HONOR. 
19 THE COURT: WHY DON'T WE SET IT FOR AN HOUR 
20 AND A HALF HEARING FOR NOVEMBER 6, AT 8:30. OKAY. 
21 ANY DIFFICULTY WITH WITH THAT, COUNSEL? 
22 MR. BROWN: IS THAT A FRIDAY? 
23 THE COURT: IT'S A THURSDAY MORNING AT 
24 8:30, AND I'M SETTING THIS SO THAT IT'S 8:30 TO TEN, 
25 BECAUSE TEN O'CLOCK WOULD BE MY TIME THAT I WOULD BE 
I 1 _ _ 
1 ANTICIPATING BEGINNING A TRIAL. 
2 MR. BROWN: THAT SHOULD BE OKAY, YOUR 
3 HONOR. 
4 THE COURT: I WILL APPRECIATE IT IF THIS 
5 MATTER, WHEN YOU GET ALL THE THE DATA AND THE 
6 RECORDS, IF YOU HAVE AN ABILITY TO STIPULATE, LET ME 
7 KNOW WELL IN ADVANCE OF THAT, SO THAT I CAN HAVE 
8 THAT TIME BACK. I DO HAVE A TRIAL SET THE DAY 
9 BEFORE, AND IF I COULD START THAT TRIAL EARLIER I 
10 WOULD. 
11 SO THERE IS GOING TO BE NO COMMUNICATION 
12 BETWEEN US BETWEEN NOW AND THE DATE OF THE 
13 RESTITUTION HEARING. NO PRETRIAL OR ANYTHING LIKE 
14 THAT. SO LET ME KNOW IN ADVANCE IF YOU CAN REACH AN 
15 AGREEMENT. 
16 MR. BROWN: SHALL WE EXECUTE THIS? 
17 THE COURT: YES. IF YOU WILL SIGN THE 
18 STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT. AND MR. BROWN, YOU 
19 STATED THAT YOU WANTED TO SAY SOMETHING MORE ABOUT 
20 THE FACTS AND ELEMENTS? 
21 • MR. BROWN: YES. IF YOU'D LIKE ME TO. 
22 THE COURT: I THOUGHT YOU SAID YOU WERE 
23 GOING TO. 
24 MR. BROWN: THE ISSUE IS, SHE PUT IN HER 
25 RESIGNATION FOR THE EMPLOYMENT, AND AT THE TIME SHE 
. 1_2_ 
1 PUT IN HER RESIGNATION SHE STILL HAD SOME MONEY 
2 COMING ON COMMISSIONS. SHE DIDN'T RECEIVE A SALARY; 
3 SHE GOT A PERCENTAGE OF ALL THE BOOK SALES. SHE 
4 MADE SIXTEEN PERCENT. AND THE RESIGNATION -- THE 
5 LETTER OF RESIGNATION WAS IN AUGUST OF '94, AND SO 
6 TERMINATED HER EMPLOYMENT AT THAT TIME. 
7 AND AFTER SHE TERMINATED HER EMPLOYMENT. 
8 CHECKS CAME TO HER DIRECTLY FROM THE PEOPLE THAT SHE 
9 SOLD THE BOOKS TO. SO SHE ENDORSED THE CHECKS AND 
10 DEPOSITED THEM IN HER BANK ACCOUNT. 
11 ACTUALLY, I THINK HER SISTER DID ON TWO OF 
12 THEM. BUT SHE FELT THAT SHE HAD THE MONEY COMING, 
13 AND THAT WAS THE ISSUE. 
14 THE COURT: I GUESS THAT WOULD BE BE OFFSET 
15 AGAINST THE 16 PERCENT OR 18 PERCENT. 
16 MR. BROWN: YES. 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. THE RECORD 
18 MAY SHOW IN OPEN COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS SIGNED 
19 THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WILL 
20 ADD ITS SIGNATURE AS A WITNESS TO HERS. YOU WILL 
2 1 NOTE I HAVE GONE THROUGH AN ABBREVIATED COLLOQUY IN 
2 2 THIS CASE. 
23 JUST SO THAT EACH OF YOU UNDERSTAND, FOR 
24 THE COMPUTER'S PURPOSES, THIS CASE WILL BE DISMISSED 
25 UNDER A CATEGORY CALLED "OTHER," AND IT SIMPLY WILL 
I3_ 
1 I BE DISMISSED AS OF THIS TIME. THAT DOESN'T MEAN 
2 IT'S RESOLVED, IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT FOR COMPUTER 
3 PURPOSES IT'S NOT AN ON-GOING, PENDING CASE. 
4 MR. BROWN: THANK YOU. 
5 THE COURT: OKAY. 
6 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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ADDENDUM F 
Statutory Provisions 
CHAPTER 2a 
PLEAS IN ABEYANCE 
Violation of plea in abeyance 
agreement — Hearing — Entry 
of judgment and imposition of 
sentence — Subsequent pros-
ecutions. 
77-2a-l. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) aPlea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest 
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction 
against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply 
with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into 
between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms 
and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the 
court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-l, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 82, 5 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-
77-2a-2, Plea in abeyance agreement — Negotiation — 
Contents — Terms of agreement — Waiver of 
time for sentencing. 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to 
entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon 
motion of both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in 
abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor 
impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained in Rule 
22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a 
plea in abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any 
plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court 
hearing relating to a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(4) (a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecu-
tion and the defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, 
Action 
T7-2a-l 
Section 
Definitions. 77-2a-4. 
**.2a-2. Plea ^ advance agreement — 
Negotiation — Contents — 
Terms of agreement — Waiver 
of time for sentencing. 
-
-2a*3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers 
of court. 
77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers of court. 
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement 
shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon 
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the 
agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction 
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the 
case. 
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a 
plea in abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offense, 
dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as 
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense 
pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section 
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the 
^ministration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on 
Orobation to the court under Section 77-18-1. 
H
 (5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and 
oUrsuant to the terms of the agreement: 
v
 (a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance tee, 
which shall be allocated in the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine 
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which could have been 
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense; . . 
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of adminis-
tration of the agreement; 
(c) order the defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his actions as 
provided in Section 76-3-201; 
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program 
required by the terms of the agreement; and 
(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could 
have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sen-
tencing for the same offense. , , 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney 
not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not subject to judicial review. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense 
against a victim who is under the age of 14. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-3, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted full" be-
1993, ch. 82, § 5; 1995, ch- 301, * 2. fore "restitution" in Subsection (5XO. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
77*2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hear-
ing — Entry of judgment and imposition of sen-
tence — Subsequent prosecutions. 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, 
formation comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that 
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the 
request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, 
or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear 
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court 
yhould not find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the 
agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the 
court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term 
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agree-
ment and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the 
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the 
defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall 
be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry 
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any 
independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation 
of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed 
in abeyance. 
Hiitory: C. 1953, 77-2a-4, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1*93, ch. 82, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. rial anti-theft laws, § 4Ma-1308 et sea 
1973, ch. 196, } 76^-404 Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et see. 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe- ^ 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 16. 
